2 min read
Sources:
Form 1-SA June 30, 2026 (portfolio, cost, purchases, rent); Form 1-A September 2, 2026 (business model, no bank debt, in-house management, Utah lots); Kevin’s account (the California thesis)
Last reviewed:
Short answer
Institutions buy at scale, at or near market, often new or turnkey, with leverage, in fast-growing metros, and outsource management. Reinvest buys one distressed property at a time below market, mostly in Southern California, renovates through subcontractors, holds with no mortgage, and manages in house. The scale is 38 properties at June 30, 2026, bought for $65,880,838 in total, against portfolios of tens of thousands of homes at the large single-family-rental companies. The bets are different too. An institution bets on rent growth and on the spread between its yield and its cost of debt. Reinvest bets that hard-to-build California markets stay scarce and that buying broken houses cheaply creates equity on day one. The filed yield so far is about 4.1% gross on cost; the discount and the renovation are where the company says the return is, and the filings do not yet let anyone check that per property.
Numbers on this page are a head start for your own analysis, not a substitute for it. They were read or computed from the company’s SEC filings on a given date and may be out of date or wrong. The SEC filings control. Verify every figure on SEC EDGAR (CIK 0001945278) before relying on it.
Portfolio at June 30, 2026: 38 properties (32 houses, 4 small multifamily buildings with 63 apartments, 1 commercial building, 2 Utah lots), $65,880,838 at cost
Leverage: none; institutions typically fund with mortgage or securitized debt
Market: mostly Southern California, by design; institutions concentrate in high-growth Sun Belt metros
Management: in house; institutions commonly use third-party or scaled internal platforms
Side by side
Large single-family-rental institutions | Reinvest (House Hack, Inc.) | Reinvest source | |
|---|---|---|---|
What they buy | Homes at or near market, often new-build or turnkey, frequently in bulk | Distressed or dated properties, one at a time, below market, then renovated | Form 1-A, Business; Kevin’s account |
Where | High-growth Sun Belt metros where building is easy and migration is strong | Mostly Southern California, plus two development lots in Utah | Form 1-SA; Form 1-A |
Scale | Tens of thousands of homes | 38 properties | Form 1-SA, June 30, 2026 |
Debt | Mortgage and securitized debt; returns depend on the spread over borrowing costs | None. $38.6 million of unsecured convertible bonds at the company level, no property pledged | Form 1-SA, balance sheet and Note 6 |
Management | Third-party managers or large internal platforms | In house; the circular says the company “has elected to perform property management with internal teams” | Form 1-A, property risk factors |
Renovation | Standardized make-ready at scale | Subcontracted per job, the rule since the 2017 construction loss | Kevin’s account; Form 1-A |
Where the return comes from | Rent growth, appreciation, leverage | The purchase discount, the renovation, California scarcity, plus rent | Kevin’s account |
Reporting | Quarterly, exchange-listed, independent directors | Semiannual Regulation A reports, no listing, no independent director described | Form 1-A; Form 1-K |
The Reinvest model, in Kevin’s words
Kevin’s account: parts of Florida and Texas overbuilt and saw home values collapse from excess supply plus a lack of new migrants. That is why the company invests heavily in California: an arbitrage bet that California housing will remain incompetent, locking in property-tax levels and a lack of new construction despite job influx.
The filed version of the same idea: buy below market with a target of about 20% equity after repairs, hold with no mortgage, and manage the buildings yourself. The circular describes the strategy and the no-debt policy; the 20% target is Kevin’s stated figure and is not reported per property.
What the filings show about the buying
Period | Real estate bought | Properties at period end | Rent in the period | Real estate at cost at period end |
|---|---|---|---|---|
2025 | not stated as a single figure in the 1-K MD&A | 37 at December 31, 2025 | $2,455,813 | $57,101,636 |
First half of 2026 | $8,779,544 | 38 at June 30, 2026 | $1,352,700 | $65,880,838 |
Thirty-eight properties for $65.9 million is an average of about $1.73 million per property, which fits California and fits a mix of houses, small apartment buildings, one commercial building and two lots. An institution’s average home in the Sun Belt costs a fraction of that, which is one reason the two models are not really competing for the same houses.
What each model needs to be right
Institutions need | Reinvest needs |
|---|---|
Rents to keep rising faster than costs | To have bought cheaply enough that the renovation creates equity |
Borrowing costs below property yields | Nothing on rates; no debt to reprice |
Migration into its metros to continue | California scarcity to persist and permitting to stay slow for everyone else |
Third-party managers to perform at scale | A small in-house team to keep 38 properties leased and maintained |
Capital markets open for refinancing | The bond program and the preferred offering to keep funding purchases |
What each gives up
Institutions give up the discount; there is no wedge in a bulk purchase of new homes. Reinvest gives up scale and the amplification of debt, and it takes on concentration: one state, one small team, one founder. The filed yield on cost, about 4.1% gross, is low for either model and reflects a portfolio still being assembled. Which approach is right depends on where the market goes, which is the bet an investor in either is making.
The honest objections
“Everyone says they buy below market.” Correct. Reinvest publishes no per-property purchase price against appraised value, so the claim cannot be audited from outside. The only check on record is the two related-party purchases, both bought below appraisal.
“California is the worst landlord state.” The circular lists rent control, tenant rules and permitting delays as risks. Kevin’s thesis is that the same rules keep supply scarce. Both can be true.
“Thirty-eight properties is a hobby next to 80,000.” It is a different business. The question is whether the per-property discount beats the institutions’ cost of capital over time, and nobody has the data yet.
Small, ugly, unlevered and local, on purpose. The opposite of a fund buying a thousand new houses in Texas with borrowed money. The filings show the no-debt part. The buy-cheap part is Kevin’s claim until the company reports it per property.
Simply put
✅ Institutions
➡️ Buy lots of houses at market price, often new, with loans, where cities are growing fast.
✅ Reinvest
➡️ Buys the worst house on the block, fixes it, keeps it, owes nothing on it.
➡️ Mostly Southern California, because it is hard to build there. 38 properties for about $66 million.
✅ The bet
➡️ Institutions need rents to rise and loans to stay cheap. Reinvest needs to have bought cheap, and nobody outside can check that yet.
Sources
Form 1-SA, six months ended June 30, 2026: 38 properties; real estate at cost $65,880,838; purchase of real estate $8,779,544; rental income $1,352,700; no mortgage debt; bonds $38,612,004. Open the Form 1-SA
Form 1-K for 2025: 37 properties at year end; real estate at cost $57,101,636; rental income $2,455,813. Open the Form 1-K
Form 1-A offering circular, September 2, 2026: business description; no bank debt; in-house property management; subcontracted construction; Utah lots; California regulatory risks. Open the Form 1-A
Kevin’s account, Housing, the core thesis: “parts of Florida and Texas overbuilt and saw home values collapse … my startup invests heavily in California.” Read the excerpt
All filings: SEC EDGAR, CIK 0001945278
Verify against the SEC record
Read this before you rely on anything above. Every number, date and quote on this page is a starting point for your own analysis. We took them from House Hack, Inc.’s public SEC filings, or computed them from those filings, as of the review date shown on this page. Filings get amended, figures get restated, and we can make mistakes in reading or arithmetic. If anything here differs from an SEC filing, the filing is right and this page is wrong. Do not make an investment decision on this page. Open the filings on SEC EDGAR (CIK 0001945278), read the risk factors, and check each figure yourself or with a licensed adviser. Nothing on this site is investment, legal or tax advice.
These anchors are the same on every page of this Library. Each line names the filing on SEC EDGAR, CIK 0001945278, where the fact can be checked.
SEC inquiry HO-15114: closed February 9, 2026, no enforcement action recommended. Record: Form 1-K (filed April 30, 2026) and Form 1-SA, Legal Proceedings. Open the Form 1-SA
Independent audit: annual, under PCAOB standards, by dbbmckennon. Record: Form 1-K, independent auditor’s report. Open the Form 1-K
Balance sheet, June 30, 2026: 38 properties, no mortgage debt, $16.3 million liquid assets, $38.6 million of 5% bonds. Record: Form 1-SA. Open the Form 1-SA
H1 2026 results: $3,174,550 revenue, $539,484 operating income, $150,608 GAAP net loss after bond interest. Record: Form 1-SA. Open the Form 1-SA
2025 option plan: $0.66 strike, no vesting before December 17, 2030, seven price and valuation hurdles. Record: Form 1-U/A. Open the EDGAR filing list
Liquidity: no public market and no redemption right for Class A shares. Record: Form 1-A offering circular. Open the Form 1-A
Founder’s personal matters: the 2023 DFPI consent order and the 2023 FTX settlement are Kevin Paffrath’s personally; House Hack, Inc. was not a party. Record: Form 1-K, Legal Proceedings. Open the Form 1-K
Series A Preferred offering: subject to SEC qualification
House Hack, Inc. (Reinvest) has filed an offering statement on Form 1-A, as amended, with the Securities and Exchange Commission for its Series A Preferred Stock. That offering statement has not yet been qualified by the SEC, and the offering is subject to qualification. Pages on this site that discuss the Series A Preferred, its $1.90 price, its 7% dividend, or its terms describe a proposed offering, not a completed one.
No money or other consideration is being solicited, and if sent in response, will not be accepted. No offer to buy the securities can be accepted and no part of the purchase price can be received until the offering statement is qualified, and any such offer may be withdrawn or revoked, without obligation or commitment of any kind, at any time before notice of its acceptance given after the qualification date. A person’s indication of interest involves no obligation or commitment of any kind.
The preliminary offering circular, which is part of the offering statement, is the document to read before deciding anything. It contains the risk factors, the terms, the financial statements and the use of proceeds. Read the preliminary offering circular on SEC EDGAR. When the offering statement is qualified, this notice will be updated and the final offering circular will be linked here.
Related pages
What does Reinvest own, county by county? Occupancy, rents and leases at September 30, 2026
How many people work at Reinvest? Why the SEC filing says three employees for an $80 million company
Is Reinvest actually profitable, or is it losing money?
Can you actually get your money out of Reinvest?
Does Reinvest publish yield projections, and how does it handle rising costs?
Has House Hack hit the goals in its original pitch?
How does Reinvest handle zoning, renovation delays and tenant regulation?
How does Reinvest's acquisition model differ from institutional home buyers?
Company facts and numbers on this site are a head start for your own analysis, not a substitute for it. They may be out of date or wrong. The SEC filings control. Verify everything on SEC EDGAR, CIK 0001945278, before relying on it. Nothing here is investment, legal or tax advice.
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